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KATZENBACH V. McCLUNG REVISITED:
HOW THE RENQUIST AND ROBERTS COURTS WOULD
HAVE DECLDED THE CASE
by
Carly Jannetty*
with
Sharlene A. McEvoy**
I. Introduction

Consider the following hypothetical.
A vegetarian living in a small coastal New England town
decides to open a restaurant, named Veggies, that only serves
salads and soups. The freshness of these menu options is going
to be Veggie's biggest selling point and it advertises
accordingly: nothing processed, canned or shipped from out of
state will do. To ensure freshness, Veggies negotiates supply
contracts with local farn1ers all within the state.

*BA Western New England College, J.D. Pace University
School of Law, M.A. Fairfield University. She is a practicing
attorney in Manhattan.
**Professor of Business Law, Charles F. Dolan School of
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McEvoy suggested the topic which arose out of a discussion in
the course The Supreme Court in the 1960's. McEvoy
presented the paper at the 2012 NEALSB meeting and edited
the article for publication.
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The restaurant is going to be based in an old farmhouse on
private property that is visible from the road, but several miles
from the closest highway. All of the furniture and decor is
purchased locally.
There's just one snag: Veggies will not serve customers who
are known for being racist. It is located in rural area with
parochial racial views, and as certain clientele have been turned
away, claims have started swirling that Veggies is engaging in
discriminatory practices. As claims have grown to harassment,
Veggies files a lawsuit seeking declaratory judgment that it has
the right to decline service at its sole discretion. Miraculously,
the case has made' its way to the Supreme Court and will be
heard in the upcoming session. What will the outcome be?
Counsel for the protestors rely heavily upon the 1964 Supreme
Court decision of Katzen bach v. McClung in which the owner
of Ollie's BBQ sought a declaratory judgment that he did not
have to serve blacks in his privately owned, local restaurant
despite the passage ofthe Civil Rights Act of 1964 1•
Since its opening, Ollie's had a policy of only allowing whites
to be served indoors, restricting service for blacks to a take-out
window. The restaurant was located 11 blocks from an
interstate on a state highway and even further away from any
2
railroad or bus station. In the year prior to passage of the Act,
Ollie's had purchased approximately $150,000 of food locally,
46% of which was meat purchased from a local retailer who
had obtained it from an out of state third party supplier. 3
Despite passage of the law, Ollie's announced its intent to
continue its discriminatory practices, believing that forced
compliance would result in the Joss of business, as it catered to
mainly local, white families who would decline to eat with
blacks in the dining room. 4
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The Supreme Court unanimously held that Ollie's
BBQ's refusal to serve blacks was unconstitutional and in
violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which barred racial
discrimination at any restaurant that serves or offers to serve
food to interstate travelers or that obtains a substantial amount
of food that has moved in interstate commerce. 5 The Court
stated that the Act was enforceable against Ollie's because it
was participating in interstate commerce, which fell under
6
Congress's power to regulate through the Commerce Clause.
Counsel for Veggie's would argue that the Katzenbach
decision wrongly assigned an overly expansive view of the
Commerce Clause for purposes of remedying a social ill and
that Ollie's operated on a primarily local basis and therefore
should not have been subject to regulation by Congress, whose
regulatory power is limited to interstate economic activities.
Because Veggies is operating in a similar fashion, it should be
exempt from regulation by Congress under a proper
interpretation of the Commerce Clause. That the holding in
Katzenbach is specious is strengthened by subsequent cases
where Congress's ability to legislate policy through the
Commerce Clause was denied by the Court, in United States v.
Lopez and United States v. Morrison, in which the Supreme
Court struck down acts of Congress holding that the Commerce
Clause did not grant Congress a police power to regulate any
economic activity that it could only tenuously connect to
interstate commerce.
While many scholars concede that Katzenbach played a
critical role in combating the rampant racism in America at that
time, others argue the decision ranks among the most flawed in
Supreme Court history. Would the outcome be the same if the
Supreme Court decided Katzenbach today? The thesis of this
article is the Katzenbach was wrongly decided based on the
clear meaning of the Commerce Clause, which does not allow
Congress to regulate economic activities that are local in nature.
This article will examine the legal missteps ofthe Warren
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Court in improperly expanding the Commerce Clause to
regulate local economic activity.
II. Expansive Interpretations ofthe Commerce Clause
In the 1942 decision of Wickard v. Filburn, the Court
determined that Congress had the authority to regulate
7
economic activity through the Commerce Clause. This Clause
applies only to economic activities if they are interstate in
8
nature, that is, if they involve activities that cross state lines.
An Ohio wheat farmer, Roscoe Filburn, brought suit against
Secretary of Agriculture, Claude R . Wickard, contesting the
constitutionality of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938
and its penalties. 9 The law mandated limitations on the amount
of wheat each farmer could produce, calculated on a per
acreage basis, to prevent overages or shortages that would
10
cause market prices to fluctuate.
Prior to passage of the law, Filburn had planed a winter
. 1 use. II A s requtre
. d
crop of wheat for personal and commercia
by law, he was notified prior to the 1941 planting that his
assigned wheat cror was fixed at 20.1 bushels for each of his
11.1 allotted acres. 2 Ignoring this restriction, he sowed 23
acres in the winter of 1940, resulting in an "overproduction" of
239 bushels. Under the Act, this overproduction constituted
" marketing excess" which resulted in a penalty of 49 cents per
13
excess bushel.
Filburn refused to pay the penalty and to deliver the
14
excess wheat to the Secretary of Agriculture. He filed a
lawsuit to enjoin enforcement of the Act and sought a
declaratory judgment that the law unconstitutionally exceeded
15
Congress's power to regulate commerce. The federal district
court determined that Filburn was not subject to the amended
Act because it would impose retroactive penalties in violation
16
ofthe Fifth Amendment and thus found them unenforceable.
The decision was based primarily on comments made by
Wickard during a mid-day radio address to wheat farmers
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which few heard because of the time it was broadcast. 17 The
Secretary appealed to the Supreme Court. 18
Filburn argued that his production of wheat for personal
consumption was beyond the power of Congress to regulate
through the Commerce Clause, as his production was "local" in
character and any effect that his production had on interstate
commerce was "'m d'Irect " at best. 19 The government countered
that the Act was aimed at regulating the sa le and prices of
wheat, and not its production or consumption, which it could
do under the Commerce Clause. 20 In addition, it argued that
the Act was "sustainable as a ' necessary and proper'
implementation of the power of Congress over interstate
commerce. " 21
After a lengthy analysis of the Commerce clause, the
Court determined that economic activities appearing local in
nature could still be subject to legislative regulation if they
have an impact on interstate commerce through repetition .
What if other farn1ers ignored the law as Filburn did? 22 The
Court noted that Filburn's act of growing excess wheat for
personal consumption, if considered in the aggregate, could
substantially affect both the price and availability of wheat on
the market. 23
The Warren Court relied heavily upon Wickard in
Katzenbach. Like Filbum, McClung, the owner of Ollie's
BBQ, sought a declaratory judgment that an Act of Congress
based on the Commerce Clause was unconstitutional. 24
McClung sued to enjoin the government from forcing him to
comply with Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which
states that persons could not be turned away on discriminatory
grounds from restaurants that served or offered to serve food to
interstate travelers or if they obtained a substantial amount of
food through interstate commerce. 25
The district court determined that Ollie's was not
subject to regulation by the Act, as Congress had " legislated a
conclusive presumption that a restaurant affects interstate
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commerce if it serves or offers to serve interstate travelers or if
a substantial rortion of the food which it serves has moved in
commerce." 2 The Court determined that such legislation was
inappropriate because Congress had failed to establish a
"demonstrable connection" between the meat obtained from
out of state by the third party retailer and the conclusion that
Ollie's discriminatory practices would affect interstate
commerce." 27 Thus, Ollie's was granted the injunction and
declaratory judgment that its policy of race-based service was
28
not subject to regulation by the Civil Rights Act of I 964.
The government appealed, and the case went to the
Supreme Court. In evaluating whether Ollie's was subject to
the Act, Justice Clark, writing for the majority, discussed the
findings of the extensive congressional hearings, which
included an abundance of testimony indicating that racial
discrimination at restaurants had acted as a deterrent for many
blacks, who then choose to spend their money elsewhere
29
resulting in lower profits for certain restaurants. In tum,
these restaurants purchased Jess food from the market. 30 There
was also testimony that discrimination in restaurants had a
significant impact on interstate travel, as blacks were prevented
from purchasing food while traveling except at undesirable
locations, and would avoid travel rather than risk being
31
subjected to discrimination. In addition, both new businesses
and black, skilled workers were deterred from settling in areas
where racial discrimination at restaurants was rampant because,
as the Court pointed out, "one can hardly travel \'.ithout
. ,,p
eatmg. Despite these findings, counsel for Ollie's argued that
Congress had overstepped its bounds by attempting to regulate
the activity of all restaurants rather than evaluating each on a
33
case-by-case basis. Instead, Ollie's argued that Congress
"arbitrarily created a conclusive presumption that all
restaurants meeting the criteria set out in the Act 'affect
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commerce,"' which, it argued, was inappropriate in this
instance because Ollie's was operating solely on a local basis. 34
The Court was not persuaded and reversed the lower
court's decision. Based on Wickard v. Filbum, it determined
that the economic impact of the food purchased by Ollie's was
insignificant, but if other restaurants followed suit, the effect
on interstate commerce would be great. 35
The Court determined that as long as Congress had a
rational basis for its legislation, it could act in a preventative
manner. 36 Because the record of congressional hearings was
replete with indications that racial discrimination in restaurants
already existed and was spreading and would presumably have
a negative effect on interstate commerce, the Court specifically
noted that "Congress was not required to await the total
37
dislocation of commerce" prior to taking action. Thus, the
Court held that "where we find that the legislators, in light of
the facts and testimony before them, have a rational basis for
finding a chosen regulatory scheme necessary to the protection
of commerce, our investigation is at an end." 38 Furthermore,
the Court reiterated its prior holding in Wickard v. Filbum,
specifically stating that the power of Congress did extend to
local activities "even if[the] activity [is] local and though it
may not be regarded as commerce ... if it exerts a substantial
. e f'fiect on mterstate
.
econom1c
commerce. " 39
Ill. Controlling the Breadth of the Commerce Clause
Consider what the outcome of Katzen bach would have
been had it been decided by the Supreme Court thirty-one years
later. In 1995, the Court issued a ruling in U.S. v. Lopez,
striking down the Gun-Free School Zone Act of 1990, a law
?rohibited the possession of a gun
?Jounds or
wtthm I ,000 feet of a school. as unconstltutwnal. The law
was premised upon the notion that the presence of guns in
school zones negatively affects the interstate commerce in two
ways: 1) necessitating higher insurance premiums that must be

2013 I Katzenbach v. McClung I 36

carried by the population, and 2) deterring travel to parts of the
41
country deemed as unsafe.
The Supreme Court rejected these contentions,
determining that gun possession within a school zone could not
even remotely be classified as an economic activity subject to
regulation by Congress through the Commerce Clause because
such possession, even when considered in the aggregate, does
not substantially affect interstate commerce. 42 The majority
opinion, authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist and joined by
Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas, noted the
danger in allowing Congress to legislate through the
Commerce Clause where the connection to interstate
commerce is tenuous, 'writing "[t]o uphold the Government's
contentions here, we would have to pile inference upon
inference in a manner that would bid fair to convert
congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a
general police power of the sort retained by the States." 43
The Court analyzed the enumeralion of powers among
the separate branches of government, cautioning that giving
Congress free rein to legislate any activity it cold vaguely
connect to interstate commerce would "effectually obliterate
ihe distinction between what is national and what is local and
create a completely centralized government." 44 In addition to
warning against acts of Congress that would foster the creation
of a centralized, rather than enumerated, national government,
the Court also made the significant point that if it were to allow
Congress to invoke the power of the Commerce Clause in an
unchecked manner, it would be "hard pressed to posit any
activity by an individual that Congress is without power to
regulate," such as telling local restaurants whom it must
.. serve. ' Consequently, the 0 un-Free School Zone Act of 1990
was declared unconstitutional.
In a concurring opinion, Justices Kennedy and
O 'C onnor took the majority position one step further arguing
that to allow Congress to legislate through the Commerce
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Clause, despite a weak connection between the regulated
activity and interstate commerce, would result in the
destruction of government accountability. Permitting Congress
to legislate in an unimpeded manner would not only "[blur] the
boundaries between the spheres of federal and state authority."
but it would also result in the ''inability to hold either branch of
the government answerable to the citizens [which is] more
dangerous even than devolving too much authority to the
46
remote central power. " Justice Kennedy also discussed at
length the Framers' intent in crafting the Constitution by
creating a government marked by separation of powers and
checks and balances, not a centralized government controlled
47
by Congress. The Court therefore should, through judicial
review, protect the enumeration of powers prescribed by the
Constitution, which it failed to do in Wickard and
Katzen bach. 48
In another concurring opinion, Justice Thomas
observed "our case law has drifted far from the original
understanding of the Commerce Clause," remarking the hope
that "in a future case, we ought to temper our Commerce
Clause jurisprudence in a manner that both makes sense of our
more recent case law and is more faithful to ... that Clause." 49
That jurisprudence would make clear that Congress does not
have regulatory police power and, in fact, that there are real
limits to the scope of its power to legislate. 50 hnportantly, he
reminded that where the Constitution was meant to grant
authority to Congress to regulate interstate commerce, it
contains a specifically enumerated power, such as the power to
coin money and the power to establish post offices and roads. 51
Had the Framers intended for Congress to regulate nearly all
economic activities, they would have delineated such intentions
along with the other powers specifically reserved for Congress.
The fact that the Constitution contains no such enumeration is
both paramount and instructive. Congress should be prevented
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from acting as though it has the police power under the guise of
regulating interstate commerce.
Without question the Katzenbach decision would have
been decided differently by the Lopez Court. Certainly those
Justices that joined in the majority opinion in Lopez would
agree, that just as one would be hard pressed to find a
connection between guns in school zones and interstate
commerce, one would be similarly hard pressed to find a
connection between a small town restaurant that caters to a
local clientele and interstate commerce. The Lopez majority
specifica1ly rejected the argument that guns in school zones
negatively affected travel and deterred new settlement as a
means of classifying guns in school zones as an economic
activity. These same arguments regarding travel and
settlement were accepted by the Warren Court in
Katzenbach. 52 In 1995. they would have been rejected by the
Renquist court.
The only potential connection between Ollie's BBQ
and interstate commerce was that so{ne of its meat was
procured from a local buyer who received it from an out of
state third party. This connection is just as tenuous, if not more,
than the contention that guns school zones will res ult in higher
insurance premiums and a decrease in travel. Ollie's owner did
not travel out of state to purchase any food nor did he
knowingly contract with any out of state suppliers. The fact
that a local supplier with whom he had a relationship tended to
secure meat from out of state was not a conscious act by Ollie
to conduct business across state lines.
Furthennore, as highlighted by Justice Thomas's
concurring opinion in Lopez, Congress' action would surely be
likened to a police power if afforded the power to dictate who
restaurateurs are required to serve on their private property
absent any substantial connection between the restaurant's
activity and interstate commerce. Even if considered in the
aggregate, a restaurant's selection of patrons does not rise to
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the level necessary for Congress to have the authority to
regulate in protection of interstate commerce. At worst, those
local patrons that know they will not be pern1itted to dine in
one restaurant will either spend their money at a grocery store
or go to a different restaurant. The fact that everyone needs to
eat was a point that was ironically and mistakenly used by the
Warren Court in support of its decision to uphold the Act
against Ollie's BBQ. Either way, money spent on food is
entering a market, leading to the conclusion that interstate
commerce is not substantially affected by a local restaurant's
practices, however discriminatory they may be. The Rehnquist
Court would not have maintained the connection recognized by
the Warren Court between the meat and interstate commerce
and, if the same line of reasoning applied in Lopez was applied
in Katzenbach, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 would have been
struck down as applied to Ollie's BBQ.
The Rehnquist Court's 2000 decision in U.S. v.
Morrison reached a conclusion similar to that in Lopez
regarding Congress's ability to legislate through the Commerce
Clause. ln Morrison, Rehnquist writing for the majority and
joined by O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas, struck
down the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 as
unconstitutional, determining that the violent act of rape was
not an economic activity and Congress's attempt to regulate it
53
.
exceede d tts power.
The opinion made several references to the decision in
Lopez, specifically noting that it applied to the fact that the
Commerce Clause could not be used by Congress to regulate
activities that were noneconomic in nature, even if when
considered in the aggregate, it could have an indirect economic
54
impact. Although the government relied upon evidence
compiled in congressional hearings indicating that rape
deterred interstate travel and business, diminished national
productivity, and resulted in increased medical costs, the Court
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rejected these findings as virtually having the effect of
55
classifying rape as an economic activity.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Tliomas again
stressed that the state of modem case law with respect to
defining the scope of the Commerce Clause had diverged
greatly from its original understanding and early case law. 56
He referred to his opinion in Lopez to note that"[ u]ntil this
Court replaces its existing Commerce Clause jurisprudence
with a standard more consistent with the original understanding,
we will continue to see Congress appropriating state police
. commerce. ,s7
. o f regu Iatmg
powers un der th e gutse
Following this line of reasoning it is clear that Congress
does not have the police power to remedy social ills such as
gun violence in school zones, violence against women, or the
discriminatory actions of a private, local restaurant. The
Commerce Clause does not grant Congress the ability to
disregard the Constitution's enumeration of powers. Nor does
it afford Congress the authority to legislate in areas that are
specifically reserved for regulation by the states, or that are not
subject to legislation at all, such as the activities of a business
such as Ollie's BBQ.
The majority in Morrison thus would likely overturn the
holding of the Warren Court in Katzenbach. A local
restaurant's activities, irrespective of whether it deterred travel,
incidentally resulted in lower profits that led to fewer
purchases by the restaurant, or resulted in deterred settlement
to the area, are just that: local. They cannot be viewed as an
interstate economic activity if its practices, so far as conducted
by the restaurant, are local. Nor can they be viewed in the
aggregate so as to elevate their practices from being local in
nature to being interstate.
Even more persuasive is the Morrison majority's
reference to the Civil Rights Cases, five cases heard
58
collectively by the Supreme Court in 1883. Several AfricanAmericans filed suit claiming discrimination by theatres, hotels,
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and transit companies in violation of the Civil Rights Act of
1875. The Supreme Court held that Congress lacked the
authority to outlaw racial discrimination by private individuals
and organizations or to regulate any non-state based
59
discrimination. Writing for the majority, Justice Bradley
directed that ''[i]t would be running the slavery argument into
the ground to make it apply to every act of discrimination
which a person may see tit to make as to the guests he will
entertain, or as to the people he will take into his coach or cab
or car, or admit to his concert or theater, or deal with in other
matters of intercourse or business. " 60 While laws can be
enacted to protect against discrimination by a state or federal
body or agency, such as discrimination by police officers or on
public transportation, no such law can dictate whether one
chooses to discriminate on their O\vn property, such as in their
home or car. This decision has never been overturned. In fact,
the majority in Morrison notes its "'enduring viability. " 61
lt is safe to say that if the Morrison majority had
decided Katzenbach, the result would have been different. It is
doubtful that the Court would determine that the business of
Ollie's BBQ affected interstate commerce or that the Court
would instruct Ollie's, a privately owned, local restaurant,
about whom it must accept as patrons. Although Ollie 's
practices were morally objectionable, they were not illegal or
subject to rt!gulation by Congress. The Warren Court failed to
appreciate, or perhaps refused to acknowledge. these
differences, choosing instead to issue a unanimous decision not
based on the controlling principles outlined in the Constitution.
lV. The Roberts Court
What ifthe Roberts Court were to hear Katzenbach
today? Would the outcome have been similar to that reached
by the Rehnquist Court in Lopez and Morrison? Justices Scalia,
Thomas and Kennedy, who all joined in the majority opinions
in Lopez and Morrison, are still on the Court. Thus, only two
more votes would be needed to overturn Katzenbach.
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Justice Roberts would be one of these votes because he
indicated his agreement with the Lopez decision during the
hearings before the Judiciary Committee in 2003, during which
he stated "[i]t's not a question of an abstract fact, does this
affect interstate commerce or not, but has his body, the
Congress, demonstrated the impact on interstate commerce that
drove them to legislate? That's a very important factor. It
wasn't present in Lopez at all. " 62 It would seem that he, too,
would agree that a tenuous connection between the regulated
activity and interstate commerce is not enough to support
legislation under the Commerce Clause.
The second vote would likely come from Justice Alito,
who authored a lengthy dissenting opinion in United States v.
Rybar during his tenure on the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit. 63 He wrote that he would have struck
down congressional legislation banning private citizens from
owning submachine guns on the same grounds as outlined in
Lopez, noting that to regulate activities that are clearly local in
nature absent any actual or established connection to interstate
commerce under the guise of the Commerce Clause was an
64
unconstitutional expansion ofCongress's power. His opinion
opens with the poignant, obviously rhetorical question, "Was
U.S. v. Lopez a constitutional freak? Or did it signify that the
Commerce Clause still imposes some meaningful limits on
congressional power?" 65 He also discussed the importance of
preserving federalism as discussed in Lopez, reminding that the
sensitive balance between state and federal power should be
66
respected.
V. Conclusion
Katzenbach v. McClung was a unanimous decision
based on a moral and ethical grounds regarding race, not a
legal sound interpretation of the Constitution or the powers it
affords to Congress. The court decision was clearly a policymaking one than one aimed at correctly interpreting the law.

The outcome of Katzenbach is unsurprising, having
been before the Court only a decade after the landmark
decision of Brown v. Board of Education at a time when the
social ills of racism were still plaguing the country. It was one
of several decisions in a decade where unanimity on issues of
racial equality was of paramount concern to the Court.
However, the interpretation of the law and a government
defined by separation of powers, rather than a centralized
police power, should not have been sacrificed for purposes of
combating racism. Congress does not have the authority to
regulate private activities on private property. Just as the
government cannot force a private citizen to allow persons he
finds objectionable into his private home, it cannot force
Ollie's BBQ to serve blacks or force Veggies to serve racists in
its local, privately owned restaurant. More recent
interpretations of the Commerce Clause reveal that there are
limits to Congress's power to legislate, and those limitations
should certainly be recognized in Veggie's case.
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located in Atlanta, Georgia and was easily accessible to interstate highways
75 and 85 and state highways 13 and 41.39 It had 216 rooms and records
reveal that 75% of its guests hailed from out of state. The ovmer advertised
extensively through the national media, maintained over 50 billboards
throughout the state, and accepted convention trade from out of state.39 It
had a policy of refusing rooms to blacks and intended to continue that
policy despite passage of the Act, thus prompting the suit.39 Unlike
Katzenbach, the lower court in Heart of Atlanta issued a ruling in favor of
the government, issuing a permanent injunction requiring that the motel
refrain from implementing discriminatory practices.39 This ruling was
affirmed by the Supreme Court.
Nonetheless, assuming arguendo that the motel's activities were
found to be purely local. certainly the act that three-quarters of its 216
rooms accommodated out of state guests that would need to patronize the
local restaurants. gas stations, and convenience stores would allow for the
presumption that its local activities could substantially affect interstate
comm erce is unavoidably clear.
But is the economic effect of a small, family-o'WJ'Ied restaurant,
such as Ollie's l3BQ, that does not advertise out of state and that caters to
local families analogous to that of the Heart of Atlanta Motel ? How about
if that restaurant's only tie to interstate commerce is a local supplier that
may procure some of its goods from an out of state third party with which
the restaurant has no contact? Clearly there are differences between the
activities ofthe motel and the restaurant. Yet, the ruling in Heart of Atlanta
Motel. Inc. provided the immediate referenc e point and served as the
backdrop for the ruling in Katzenbach, however dissimilar or inapposite
their facts in terms of their etTect on interstate commerce. As a result, to
say that the decision in Katzenbach was tlawed or that the Warren Court
36
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inappropriately allowed Congress to act as a moral police power under th e
cloak of the Commerce Clause should be expected.
40 u.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S . 549,55 1 (1995).
41 Id., 514 U.S. at 563-564 (1964).
4
" Id.. 514 U.S. at 567 (1964).
43 Id.
44 Jd., 514 U.S. at 557 ( 1964) citing National Labor Rel ations Board v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation, 301 U.S. I. 37 (1937).
45 ld., 514 U.S. at 564 ( 1964).
46 Id., 514 U.S. at 577 (1%4).
47 Id., 514 U.S. at 568-583 (1964).
4R Id.
4 q ld.. 514 U.S. at 584 (1964).
50 ld.
51 Jd 514U.S.at592(l964).
5"
v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294,301 (1964).
53 u.s. v. Morrison, 529 ( 1964).
54 Jd., 529 U.S. at 610-611 (2000).
55 Id., 529 U.S. at 615 (2000).
56 [d., 529 U.S. at 627 (2000).
57 ld.
•
58 Id.• 529 U.S. at 624 (2000) citing to Civil Rights Cases. I 09 U.S. 3 ( 1883 ).
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
60 Id 109 U.S. at 24-25 (1883).
6 ' u.'S. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598. 624 (2000).
Hearings before the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate.
J08th Congress, 1st Session. U.S. Government Printing Office. Serial No. J108-1 . Part 3. Available as a PDF on the Web. Retrieved February 22,
2012.
<http://www.a ccess.gpo. gov/congress/senate/pd f/ I 08hrg/92548.pdf>
f•.l United States v. Rybar, 103 F.Jd 273,286-294 (3d Cir. 1996). Rybar was
convicted on two counts of possessing an illegal machine gun under the
Firearm Owners Protection Act of 1986, legislation created under the
Commerce Clause.
64 ld.
MId., 103 F.3d at 286 (1996).
66 Id.. 103 F.3d at 294 (1996).
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FINANCiAL LITERACY: EDUCATrNG STUDENTS TO
UNDERSTAND THE BENEFITS AND RISKS OF
INVESTMENTS
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INTRODUCTION
The financial crisis of 2007-2009 that continues to
reverberate globally exposed an underlying flaw both within
the financial community and among the general population.
The lack of knowledge about the basic understanding of
finance becomes more and more apparent. This ignorance
affects not only the public at large, but also sophisticated
investors who were deceived by the complex financial
instruments that were a hallmark of the giddy rise of values
especially in the housing market. 1
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